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APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
LIMITATIONS 
78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally. 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods pre-
scribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has ac-
crued, except in specific cases where a different limitation 
is prescribed by statute. 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
Within four years: 
(2) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
78-12-26. Within three years. 
Within three years: 
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real 
property; except that when waste or trespass is committed by 
means of underground works upon any mining claim, the cause of 
action does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved 
party of the facts constituting such waste or trespass. 
(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal 
property, including actions for specific recovery thereof; 
except that in all cases where the subject of the action is a 
domestic animal usually included in the term "livestock7 lf 
which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if 
the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without 
the owner's fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner 
has actual knowledge of such facts as would put a reasonable 
man upon inquiry as to the possession of the animal by the 
defendant. 
PARTNERSHIP 
48-1-15. Rules determining rights and duties of partners. 
(7) No person can become a member of a partnership without 
the consent of all the partners. 
48-1-28. Causes of dissolution. Dissolution is caused: 
(1) Without violation of the agreement between the partners: 
(a) By the termination of the definite term or par-
ticular undertaking specified in the agreement. 
(b) By the express will of any partner when no definite 
term or particular undertaking is specified. 
(c) By the express will of all the partners who have not 
assigned their interests, or suffered them to be 
charged for their separate debts, either before or 
after the termination of any specified term or 
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particular undertaking, 
(d) By the expulsion of any partner from the business 
bona fide in accordance with such a power conferred 
by the agreement between the partners. 
(2) In contravention of the agreement between the partners, 
where the circumstances do not permit a dissolution under any 
other provision of this section, by the express will of any 
partner at any time. 
(3) By any event which makes it unlawful for the business of 
the partnership to be carried on or for the members to carry 
it on in partnership. 
(4) By the death of any partner. 
(5) By the bankruptcy of any partner or the partnership. 
(6) By decree of court under section 48-1-29. 
48-1-29. Dissolution by decree of court. 
(1) On application by or for a partner the court shall 
decree a dissolution whenever: 
(a) A partner has been declared a lunatic in any 
judicial proceeding or is shown to be of unsound 
mind. 
(b) A partner becomes in any other way incapable of 
performing his part of the partnership contract. 
(c) A partner has been guilty of such conduct as tends 
to affect prejudicially the carrying on of the 
business. 
(d) A partner willfully or persistently commits a breach 
of the partnership agreement, or otherwise so 
conducts himself in matters relating to the partner-
ship business that it is not reasonably practicable 
to carry on the business in partnership with him. 
(e) The business of the partnership can only be carried 
on at a loss. 
(2) On the application of the purchaser of a partner's 
interest under sections 48-1-24 or 48-1-25. 
(a) After the termination of the specified term or 
particular undertaking. 
(b) At any time, if the partnership was a partnership at 
will, when the interest was assigned or when the 
charging order was issued. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
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(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim 
for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the 
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that 
the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be 
made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper 
venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of 
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable 
party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made 
before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or 
more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or 
motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion 
or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to 
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or 
fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the 
defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the 
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment 
and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall 
be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in 
an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. 
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed 
by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants, Helmut E. Reinicke ("Reinicke") and Allison 
Garland ("Garland") object to plaintiffs7 Statement of Facts 
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to the extent that such statements are conclusions of law, 
irrelevant and immaterial, and attempt to add facts which are 
not part of the record and were not plead or argued in the 
lower court. For example, plaintiffs7 statement that, 
"Mueller found that Reinicke was involved with illicit drugs" 
is, and has been throughout this case, irrelevant, immaterial, 
malicious and defamatory. The lower court ordered such state-
ments stricken from the pleadings. Plaintiffs have disre-
garded this order and again make the irrelevant allegation on 
appeal. 
Plaintiffs make several statements regarding "bribery 
payments". Defendants, as part of their Motion to Dismiss 
Amended Complaint, submitted affidavits of Reinicke and Burt 
Randall which explained the payments from Reinicke to be for 
part ownership of a boat. Defendants provided no counter-
affidavit or other evidence to refute these sworn affidavits, 
except by their "affidavit" of Allison Garland, which she 
withdrew and disavowed subsequent to making. 
Plaintiffs state that, "The motive for the burglary 
appeared to be an attempt by Reinicke to damage Appellants, 
causing them to default on the purchase contract, enabling 
Reinicke to retake the business by default according to the 
contract of purchase." This "fact" has never been alleged by 
plaintiffs in the proceedings of the lower court. This 
statement is an attempt to improve plaintiffs' position by 
adding to the facts. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The district court properly treated defendants' Rule 
12(b) Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment under 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and properly granted 
summary judgment. 
2. Plaintiffs' claims are barred by applicable statutes 
of limitation. 
3. Plaintiffs have not properly plead allegations which 
would entitle them to a tolling of the statutes of limitation 
barring their causes of action. The trial court, therefore, 
properly held the statutes to have run. 
4. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to plead causes 
of action for which relief can be granted. 
5. Plaintiffs' allegation of racketeering activities 
fails to set forth the elements of racketeering with suffi-
cient particularity to state a cause of action for which 
relief can be granted. 
6. Plaintiffs were not partners with Reinicke and were 
not entitled to a dissolution and accounting of the partner-
ship. 
7. The entry of a guilty plea by Reinicke and Garland in 
federal court bribery charges does not give rise to an action 
for interference with prospective economic relations nor is it 
a "fraud upon the court." 
8. Plaintiffs have had opportunity to amend their 
complaint and failed to do so. Permitting them to further 
amend the complaint would be unfair and burdensome to defen-
8 
dants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY TREATED DEFEN-
DANTS' RULE 12(b) MOTION TO DISMISS AS A 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 56 
AND PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in 
part: 
If, on a motion asserting the defense 
number (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded 
by the court, the motion shall be treated 
as one for summary judgment and disposed 
of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to 
such a motion by Rule 56. 
It is within the trial court's discretion whether to 
consider matters outside the pleadings. Strand v. Associated 
Students, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977). Once the trial court 
exercises its discretion to consider those matters, the motion 
to dismiss is properly treated as one for summary judgment. 
Lind v. Lvnch, 665 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1983). 
Defendants motion was one for dismissal for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The grounds 
for the motion were, primarily, running of the applicable 
statutes of limitation and failure to state prima facie causes 
of action. In addition, defendants submitted affidavits 
explaining payirents made by Reinicke to Burt Randall, which 
plaintiffs alleged to have been bribes. Plaintiffs submitted 
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no affidavits in rebuttal. 
While the court could have dismissed plaintiffs7 com-
plaint with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action, 
it was proper for the court to treat the matter as one for 
summary judgment. Since the matter was being treated as one 
for summary judgment, the provisions of Rule 56, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure apply. Rule 56(e) provides, in part: 
. . . When a motion for summary judgment 
is made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits 
or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Plaintiffs provided no affidavits or other specific facts 
in support of the allegations of bribery or any other allega-
tions in their amended complaint. Under those circumstances, 
the trial court properly concluded that there were no genuine 
issues of material fact for trial. Busch Corp. v. State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Company, 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987). The 
court's award of summary judgment was, therefore, appropriate 
and proper. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY APPLI-
CABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
Civil actions must be brought within the applicable 
statutory time periods set forth by statute. Section 78-12-1, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended provides: 
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Civil actions may be commenced only 
within the periods prescribed in this 
chapter, after the cause of action has 
accrued, expect in specific cases where a 
different limitation is prescribed by 
statute. 
This section is essentially the same as the statute in effect 
at the time the action was initiated. For purposes of this 
action, only a properly formulated racketeering cause of 
action or fraudulent concealment would permit a tolling of the 
applicable statutes of limitation. 
Plaintiffs' allegations of trespass and conversion 
occurred in 1980. The applicable statutes of limitation are 
U.C.A. 78-12-26(1) and (2) which provide a three year limit. 
Both periods had run prior to initiation of the action. All 
of the limitations for allegations included under plaintiffs' 
"negligence" cause of action had run. 
The allegations of improper interference with contractual 
relations with EIMCO and interference with prospective 
economic relations occurred in 1980 and 1981. The period of 
limitation is four years and had run. U.C.A. 78-12-25(2). 
The last event in any alleged racketeering cause of 
action must have occurred within three years of the time of 
filing the action. U.C.A. 78-12-26(4). This statutory period 
had also run. 
Plaintiffs have failed to plead any effective cause of 
action which would fall within the statutory periods of 
limitation. 
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POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT PROPERLY PLEAD ALLEGA-
TIONS WHICH WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO A TOLL-
ING OF THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION BARRING 
THEIR CAUSES OF ACTION. THE TRIAL COURT, 
THEREFORE, PROPERLY HELD THE STATUTES TO 
HAVE RUN. 
Plaintiffs have failed, as discussed below, to plead an 
effective racketeering cause of action which would permit them 
to benefit from a tolling or extension of statutes of limita-
tion. 
Plaintiffs allege on appeal, without having plead such in 
the lower court, that defendants have fraudulently concealed 
the alleged conversion of plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs 
have, at no point in this action, plead the nine elements 
necessary to establish a cause for fraudulent concealment. 
Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980). 
Plaintiffs claim that their contract action is not barred 
by the running of the statute of limitation. To begin with, 
as in the other causes of action, plaintiffs have failed to 
clearly state what basis they have for their "contract 
action". They appear to be relying on a breach of good faith 
associated with the alleged burglary. Aside from that, they 
claim, without alleging facts, that "Through intentional and 
fraudulent means Reinicke successfully concealed the fact that 
a violation of the contract had occurred." Appellants7 Brief, 
Point IV, Page 15. 
Plaintiffs' allegations are not consistent with the 
facts, as set forth by plaintiffs in their Amended Verified 
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Complaint, paragraph 9, page 7: (1) A burglary took place 
June 19, 1980. (2) "At that time there was circumstantial 
evidence to believe that Helmut [Reinicke] and Burt [Randall] 
had committed the offense." 
In view of these facts, plaintiffs ludicrously would have 
the court believe that "Reinicke successfully concealed the 
fact that a violation occurred." There obviously was no 
fraudulent concealment; therefore, the statute of limitation 
continued to run and had elapsed before this action was 
initiated. 
Considering that plaintiffs have failed to provide 
allegations or evidence sufficient to toll or extend the 
periods of limitation, the trial court could properly find 
that the statutes had run, barring plaintiffs' causes of 
action. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO 
PLEAD CAUSES OF ACTION FOR WHICH RELIEF 
CAN BE GRANTED. 
Aside from the question of limitation, plaintiffs' 
amended complaint fails to plead the elements necessary to 
establish their causes of action against defendants. Plain-
tiffs, in their conversion cause of action, have set forth the 
law as it relates to conversion, but have pleaded no facts 
establishing a conversion. Their amended complaint fails to 
state specifically what property is alleged to have been 
converted by Reinicke or that he possesses the property, that 
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they have demanded return and he refuses to return it. With-
out such facts, there can be no allegation of "a wrongful 
exercise of control over personal property in violation of the 
rights of its owner." Frisco Joes, Inc. v. Peay, 558 P.2d 
1327, 1330 (Utah 1977). While such "facts" have been set 
forth in plaintiffs' appellate brief, no such allegations were 
made in the proceedings in the lower court. 
Plaintiffs have also attempted to plead a cause of action 
for negligence in reliance upon criminal statutes. While 
statutes may set forth a standard of care, this is not true 
for every statute drafted by the legislature. The Utah 
Supreme Court, in Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 850 (Utah 
1981) has established criteria which a plaintiff must meet to 
rely on a statute for a standard of care. Plaintiffs must 
show, "(1) the existence of the statute or ordinance, (2) that 
the statute or ordinance was intended to protect the class of 
persons which includes the party, (3) that the protection is 
directed toward the type of harm which has in fact occurred as 
a result of the violation, and (4) that the violation of the 
ordinance or statute was a proximate cause of the injury com-
plained of." Hall at 850, emphasis added. 
Plaintiffs have, in fact, shown only the first of these 
elements, that the statute exists. They then make the con-
elusory, logical leap to conclude "The violation of any one or 
combination of the above crimes constitutes a violation of a 
significant minimum standard of care and duty imposed by law." 
Amended Complaint, page 22. This does not meet the burden 
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imposed by the Utah Supreme Court for imposing a standard of 
care from a statute. 
Plaintiffs7 allegations of Prima Facie Tort read like a 
memorandum rather than a properly framed complaint. The 
general implication is that, if one person feels offended by 
another, there must certainly be a tort occurring, regardless 
of the facts of the situation. 
Plaintiffs simply have not alleged any actions of defen-
dants which fall within a statutory limitation period and have 
caused damage to plaintiffs. They have failed to plead causes 
of action for which the court can grant relief. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATION OF RACKETEERING 
ACTIVITIES FAILS TO SET FORTH THE ELEMENTS 
OF RACKETEERING WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICU-
LARITY TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. 
A comprehensive discussion of the racketeering cause of 
action is set forth in defendants7 Memorandum In Support of 
Defendants7 Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Strike and Motion for 
More Definite Statement (in Addendum). 
As in plaintiffs7 other allegations, they ignore the time 
factors necessary for the requisite events to properly plead 
racketeering. In order to fall within the Utah Racketeering 
Act, U.C.A. 76-10-1601, et seq., at least one event must have 
occurred after 1981 (the enactment date of the statute). 
Except for the "ongoing conspiracy" and the payments by 
Reinicke to others, all of the events alleged by plaintiffs 
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occurred in 1980. 
In addition, the last event must have occurred within 
three years of the time of filing the action. U.C.A. 78-12-
26(4). Plaintiffs have failed to plead an effective cause of 
action which has satisfied these time requirements and would 
qualify as an act under U.C.A. 76-10-1602(1). 
Nor have plaintiffs plead the elements of racketeering 
with sufficient particularity. In the only case interpreting 
the Utah Racketeering Act in civil actions, Bache Halsey 
Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust, 558 F.Supp 
1042 (D.C. Utah 1983), the federal district court held the 
Utah act to be more demanding than the federal RICO act. 
Where the federal act requires proving injury from a pattern 
of racketeering "with enough specificity to show there is 
probable cause the crimes were committed" by the named 
defendant, Bache at 1045, under the stricter standards of the 
Utah act, 
the predicate crimes must be alleged with 
particularity. The court can determine 
whether the pleadings state a violation of 
the Utah Act only if the facts are 
sufficient to show that the alleged 
activity would be illegal in Utah and 
would fall into one of the enumerated 
categories. 
Bache at 1047, emphasis added. 
Plaintiffs rely heavily upon their allegations of 
conspiracy to support their charges of racketeering. Although 
conspiracy falls within the enumerated acts of racketeering, 
"[s]tanding alone, a charge of conspiracy does not state a 
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cause of action under the Utah Act." Bache at 1048. 
To effectively allege conspiracy as part of racketeer-
ing activity, the plaintiffs need to show that the parties 
agreed to commit two or more episodes in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, and that they actually did anything beyond 
"conspiring". 
Even in their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs fail to 
allege against these defendants: 
(1) That they agreed to commit two or more such 
episodes in furtherance of the conspiracy; 
(2) That they did anything beyond conspiring, if 
drinking together and otherwise associating 
with the other defendants constitutes conspiring; 
(3) A second episode which took place after 1980; 
(4) Any second episode occurring within five years of 
of a preceding one and within three years of the 
filing of the action; 
(5) Any satisfactory allegation, with sufficient 
particularity, of an enumerated racketeering 
activity. 
Any allegations of an "ongoing" conspiracy must show 
facts indicating that the conspiracy is, in fact, currently 
engaged in by the parties and causing damage to the plain-
tiffs. Allegations of past events, especially ones for which 
statutes of limitation have run, do not indicate that a 
"conspiracy" is actively agreed to and engaged in by the 
parties. 
Plaintiffs have failed to meet the time limitations 
imposed by statute to bring a cause of action for racketeer-
ing. In addition, they have failed to allege a satisfactory 
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set of elements to make out the racketeering cause of action. 
POINT VI 
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT PARTNERS WITH REINICKE 
AND WERE NOT ENTITLED TO A DISSOLUTION AND 
ACCOUNTING OF THE PARTNERSHIP. 
"No person can become a member of a partnership without 
the consent of all the partners.11 U.C.A. 48-1-15(7). Though 
a partner's interest in the partnership may be conveyed to a 
third person, an assignment of partnership interest does not 
give the assignee the status of partner. Benton v. 
Albuquerque National Bank, 701 P.2d 1025 (N.M.App. 1985). An 
assignee of a partnership interest is expressly limited by 
statute to (1) profits to which the assigning partner would 
otherwise be entitled and (2) upon dissolution, the assignor's 
interest and an accounting of the other partners. 
Though defendant Mueller alleged that he had purchased 
Garland's partnership interest in Progressive Machine, plain-
tiffs have set forth no facts showing that Garland, in fact, 
was a partner in Progressive Machine. One obviously cannot 
convey what one does not own. 
Even if Garland were a partner in Progressive Machine, 
her conveyance of a partnership interest did not make Mueller 
a partner with Reinicke. Reinicke, at no time, agreed or 
consented to be a partner with Mueller in Progressive Machine. 
Under such a scenario, Mueller would merely be assignee of 
Garland, entitled only to profits and Garland's interest, 
together with an accounting thereon, upon dissolution. Not 
18 
being a partner, Mueller would not be entitled to force a 
dissolution of the partnership under U.C.A. 48-1-28 or 48-1-
29. Because plaintiffs could not force a dissolution, they 
likewise were not entitled to an accounting from Reinicke. 
POINT VII 
THE ENTRY OF A GUILTY PLEA BY REINICKE AND 
GARLAND IN FEDERAL COURT BRIBERY CHARGES 
DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO AN ACTION FOR 
INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS NOR IS IT A "FRAUD UPON THE 
COURT". 
Plaintiffs rely upon Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. 
Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) for the proposition that the 
bribery of a Morton-Thiokol agent constitutes intentional 
interference with the prospective economic relations of 
plaintiffs. This reading of the case clearly expands its 
applications beyond anything intended by the court. 
Plaintiffs have never entered into contractual relations 
with Morton-Thiokol. Nor have they made attempts to establish 
economic relations with Morton-Thiokol. They believe that, 
because they might at some future time do so, they have been 
damaged. 
Such a reading of the case would permit every machine 
company in the U.S. who might believe they could get contracts 
from Morton-Thiokol to have a cause of action against defen-
dants. 
It is clear that, in order to establish a cause of action 
for interference with prospective economic relations, there 
must at least be some demonstrable damage to the plaintiff. 
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Such damages, in the present case, are clearly speculative and 
incapable of being proven. Lacking the ability to prove such 
damages, much less that there was a "prospective economic 
relation", plaintiffs have no cause of action against defen-
dants. 
The guilty plea of Reinicke and Garland to federal 
bribery charges does not establish that Reinicke and Garland 
likewise bribed an agent of EIMCO. Nor does Garland's plea 
make her disavowal of her earlier "affidavit" a fraud upon the 
court. The pleas are prima facie evidence or conclusive only 
that they bribed the Morton-Thiokol agent. They are not prima 
facie evidence or conclusive as to any of the substantive 
elements of this appeal. 
POINT VIII 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE HAD OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND 
THEIR COMPLAINT AND FAILED TO DO SO. 
PERMITTING THEM TO FURTHER AMEND THE 
COMPLAINT WOULD BE UNFAIR AND BURDENSOME 
TO DEFENDANTS. 
Plaintiffs allegations of burglary and bribery have been 
addressed by jury trial in the Third District Court, Civil No. 
C-86-7872, Honorable David S. Young presiding. Plaintiffs 
have consistently attempted to have their allegations heard in 
two forums, a tactic clearly unfair to defendants. 
In addition, plaintiffs have already been given oppor-
tunity to amend their original complaint but failed to remove 
defamatory and irrelevant material or to cure the deficiency 
of their pleadings. 
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Plaintiffs have had several opportunities to present 
their alleged "facts" to two courts, resulting in considerable 
financial cost to defendants. To allow plaintiffs another 
opportunity to amend their complaint, in view of the lack of 
facts presented so far in their pleadings and arguments, would 
put an unfair financial and emotional burden upon defendants. 
There should be some point at which this litigation can end. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court properly treated defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment and properly entered 
summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs have had 
several opportunities, in two courts, to present their 
allegations and have not successfully done so. To permit 
plaintiffs to once again amend their complaint and embroil 
defendants in legal action where the facts and law do not 
justify plaintiffs7 allegations imposes an unfair economic and 
emotional burden upon defendants. The summary judgment 
entered by the district court should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of May, 1988. 
C. Reed Brown 
Attorney for Defendants/ 
Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on the 16th day of May, 1988, I 
caused four copies of the foregoing Respondents7 Brief to be 
delivered to Loren D. Martin, Attorney for Appellants, 1200 
Beneficial Life Tower, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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C. Reed Brown (No. A0446) 
HINTZE, BROWN, FAUST, BLAKESLEY & McPHIE 
Attorney for defendants Helmut Rienicke 
and Allison Garland (Rienicke) 
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 884106 
Telephone: (8801) 484-7632 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WASATCH TOOL & DIE, INC., and 
JUERGEN MUELLER, 
Plaintiffs, 
DEFINITE STATEMENT 
vs. 
HELMUT E. RIENICKE, et. al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS, MOTION TO STRIKE, 
AND MOTION FOR MORE : 
CIVIL NO. C86-7931 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
Defendants Helmut E. Rienicke and Allison Garland (Rienicke) 
submit the following Memorandum in Support of their Motion to 
Dismiss, Motion to Strike, and Motion for More Definite Statement: 
POINT I 
VARIOUS STATUTES OF LIMITATION HAVE RUN, BARRING 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST THESE DEFENDANTS. 
PLAINTIFFS' ACTION SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE DISMISSED. 
Plaintiffs' causes of action against these defendants are 
barred by the running of the statutes of limitation involved. The 
tort claim is limited to four years from the occurrence of the 
tort. Utah Code, Section 78-12-25(2) (1953, as amended). 
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The statutory periods for burglary and theft (which are 
criminal, not civil actions) are four years, respectively. Utah 
Code 76-1-302(1)(a). These periods have run. 
Utah Code 78-12-26(2) sets forth a three year statutory period 
for limitation of conversion actions. The period has run. 
Obstructing Justice (a criminal offense) has a two year 
statute of limitation period. Utah Code 76-1-302(1)(b). The 
period has run. 
"Commercial bribery" (plaintiffs' term) is a class B mis-
demeanor with a two year statutory period. Utah Code 76-1-
302(1)(b). The period has run. 
Because the Utah Racketeering Act, Utah Code 7 6-10-1601 et 
seq., does not provide otherwise, the statute of limitation is set 
forth in 78-12-26(4) as three years. The period has run. 
The criminal offense of conspiracy carries a limitation period 
of four years, if determined to be a felony, Utah Code 76-1-
302(1)(a) or two years, if determined to be a misdemeanor, Utah 
Code 76-1-302(1)(b). A civil cause for conspiracy would be 
limited to three years, Utah Code 78-12-26, or four years, Utah 
Code 78-12-25(2), depending on the nature of the allegations. All 
of these periods have run. 
Because all of the statutory periods of limitation have run, 
plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action for which relief 
can be granted and plaintiffs' action against these defendants 
should be dismissed. 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT BEEN DILIGENT IN PURSUING 
THEIR REMEDIES; THEREFORE, THEIR CLAIMS ARE 
BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES AND SHOULD 
BE DISMISSED. 
Plaintiffs have alleged actions on the part of defendants 
which allegedly have occurred over a long period of time. In 
plaintiffs' vague allegation of Violation of Contract Obligations, 
for example, they claim offenses back to 1980. 
Plaintiffs have had sufficient opportunity to pursue their 
remedies against defendants, have failed to notify defendants of 
the actions which plaintiffs found offensive, and have made no 
claims for remedy prior to the present action. This lack of 
diligence by plaintiffs bars their action against defendants under 
the doctrine of laches. Plaintiffs7 action against these defen-
dants should, therefore, be dismissed. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE ALLEGED ACTIVITIES BY DEFENDANTS 
WHICH ARE CRIMINAL OFFENSES FOR WHICH THE CRIMINAL 
CODE PROVIDES NO EXPRESS PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION; 
THEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO CIVIL CAUSE OF ACTION 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND THE ACTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
Burglary and Theft are criminal offenses. The elements of 
burglary are set forth in Utah Code 76-6-201 to 204 and the 
elements of theft are set forth in Utah Code 76-6-401 to 412. In 
none of these statutes is there a provision for a private cause of 
action for burglary or theft. (With the exception of 76-6-412(2), 
which doesn't apply here). 
Obstructing justice is a class B misdemeanor. Utah Code 76-8-
306. There is no statutory provision for a private action for 
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obstructing justice. 
What the plaintiff calls "commercial bribery" is a class B 
misdemeanor under the provisions of Utah Code 76-6-508. The 
statute sets forth no private cause of action for bribery. 
The criminal offense of conspiracy is set forth in Utah Code 
76-4-201 to 202. These provisions specify no private cause of 
action. 
All of these causes of action alleged by plaintiffs are 
criminal activities for which no private cause of action is set 
forth in the statutes. Because of this, plaintiffs have no civil 
cause of action for these specific activities and the actions 
against defendants should be dismissed. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
DOES NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WHICH 
RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
An allegation that conduct of the defendants constitutes 
willful and malicious intent and causes damage to plaintiffs does 
not, by itself, constitute a separate cause of action. While the 
allegation may be raised as part of another cause of action, by 
itself, the allegation does not state a cause of action for which 
relief can be granted. Therefore, this cause of action should be 
dismissed. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR RACKETEERING 
ACTIVITIES FAILS TO SET FORTH THE ELEMENTS OF 
RACKETEERING WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY TO 
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WHICH RELIEF CAN 
BE GRANTED AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
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Plaintiffs' allegations of racketeering activity give rise 
a cause of action under Utah Code Section 76-10-1605(1) which 
provides, in part: 
A person who sustains injury to his person, 
business, or property by a pattern of rack-
eteering activity, in which he is not a par-
ticipant, may file an action in the district 
court. • . 
Racketeering activites are specifically enumerated in 76-1 
602. They include: 
(g) theft, . . . receiving stolen property, . . . 
(h) bribery 
(0) obstructing or hindering criminal investigations 
or prosecutions 
(x) conspiracy to commit any of the above enumerated 
offenses. 
Section 76-10-1602(4) describes a "pattern of racketeering 
activity": 
"Pattern of racketeering activity" means 
engaging in at least two episodes of racketeer-
ing conduct which have the same or similar 
objectives, results, participants, victims, or 
methods of commission, or are otherwise inter-
related by distinguishing characteristics and 
are not isolated events, provided at least one 
of the episodes occurred after the effective 
date of this part and the last occurred within 
five years after the commission of a prior 
episode of racketeering conduct. 
Broken down, this requires: 
(1) At least two episodes of racketeering conduct 
(enumerated acts under 76-10-1602(1)), 
(2) With the same or similar 
- Objectives 
- Results 
- Participants 
- Victims 
- Methods of commission 
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(3) Not isolated events 
(4) At least one event occurring after 1981 
(5) A subsequent event occurring within five years of an 
earlier event. 
The Federal District Court for Utah has interpreted the Utah 
Racketeering statute in Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Tracy 
Collins Bank & Trust Co., 558 F.Supp. 1042 (D.C. Utah 1983). In 
Bache, the defendant counter-claimed under the Federal RICO Act and 
the Utah Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act. 
The Bache court, in holding against the defendant, found the 
allegations insufficient under the Federal Act and held that the 
standards of Utah's Act were more demanding than those of the 
Federal Act. Under the Federal Act, the party bringing the action 
must prove injury from a pattern of racketeering activity, "with 
enough specificity to show there is probable cause the crimes were 
committed." Bache at 1045. The Court stated that: 
A private civil action under RICO is grounded 
upon the premise that a party has twice engaged 
in "racketeering activity". . . Before a court 
can assess the merit of a plaintiff's. . .claim 
it must determine whether there is probable 
cause to believe the named defendant committed 
the alleged predicate crimes. That deter-
mination is possible if the factual basis of 
those "acts of racketeering" is set out with 
particularity. 
Bache at 1045, emphasis added. 
Addressing the Utah Act, the court held the Utah statute to be 
more demanding than the Federal RICO Act in that it defines a 
racketeering activity to be an act illegal under the laws of Utah 
rather than merely "indictable" as in the Federal Act. The Court 
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stated: 
Like the Federal Act,. . . the Utah Rack-
eteering Act suggests that the predicate crimes 
must be alleged with particularity. The court 
can determine whether the pleadings state a 
violation of the Utah Act only if the facts are 
sufficient to show that the alleged activity 
would be illegal in Utah and would fall into 
one of the enumerated categories. 
Bache at 1047, emphasis added. j 
The Bache court also addressed the allegation of conspiracy as 
an element of a racketeering activity. The court held that the 
mere allegation of a conspiracy is insufficient to constitute a 
RICO conspiracy. "Thus, under RICO, a civil conspiracy charge 
requires an allegation that a party agreed to commit two predicate 
crimes in furtherance of the conspiracy." Bache at 1047, emphasis 
added. The court also observed that: 
Although conspiracy is one of the enumerated 
acts of racketeering,. . . conspiracy is not a 
separate basis for recovery. It is merely a 
crime that may qualify as one of the predicate 
acts needed to show a pattern of racketeering 
activity. Standing alone, a charge of con-
spiracy does not state a cause of action under 
the Utah Act. 
Bache at 1048. 
Plaintiffs, though making broad allegations against defen-
dants, have failed to allege with particularity the racketeering 
activities which would form the basis for a cause of action under 
the Racketeering Act. Plaintiffs7 allegations lack sufficient 
factual particularity to permit a court to "determine whether there 
is probable cause the defendants committed the alleged predicate 
crimes." 
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It is significant that, regarding the burglary, even according 
to plaintiffs7 Complaint, "the police did not believe there was 
sufficient information for criminal charges". Plaintiff's Com-
plaint, paragraph 5 k. at page 9. If the information regarding the 
alleged burglary was insufficient to provide probable cause of the 
offense, then plaintiffs' more general allegations of the other 
offenses certainly cannot meet the threshold requirement for 
"probable cause". 
Since plaintiffs7 complaint does not satisfy the threshold 
requirement of probable cause under the Utah Racketeering Act, 
plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action for which relief 
can be granted. Therefore, the action for racketeering activity 
should be dismissed. 
POINT VI 
PLAINTIFFS7 ALLEGATIONS OF DRUG USE, DRINKING AND 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY BY DEFENDANTS ARE IMMATERIAL, 
IRRELEVANT, MALICIOUS AND DEFAMATORY AND SHOULD 
BE STRICKEN FROM THE COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RULE 
12(f), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Plaintiffs have alleged that defendants, especially defendant 
Helmut Rienicke, used drugs, drank frequently and conducted himself 
in a criminal manner. These allegations are immaterial and 
irrelevant to the causes of action set forth by plaintiffs and are 
malicious and defamatory. 
The allegations of drug use have absolutely nothing to do with 
the causes of action asserted by plaintiffs. They should be 
stricken. 
Plaintiffs rely on the allegations of frequent drinking by 
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Helmut Rienicke and his social involvement with others in places 
where drinks are served as the basis for their allegations of 
conspiracy among the defendants. The alleged drinking activities 
have no rational relationship with any of the causes of action 
which plaintiffs put forth. They serve only to defame defendants 
in a malicious manner. These allegations should be stricken from 
the Complaint. 
Plaintiffs frequently allege that defendant, Helmut Rienicke, 
committed a burglary of plaintiffs7 premises. Though such an 
allegation might be properly raised in support of plaintiffs' 
claims of racketeering activity, the allegation is not set forth in 
the racketeering cause of action. The allegations are spread 
throughout the complaint. 
If, in fact, such an offense occurred, any liability therefore 
has long since expired with the running of the statutory period of 
limitation. The only purpose for continually raising this allega-
tion is to cast a pall upon defendants' characters. This is a 
defamatory use of the Complaint and all such allegations should be 
stricken. 
Because all of these allegations are immaterial, irrelevant, 
malicious, and/or defamatory, they should be stricken from the 
Complaint under the provisions of Rule 12(f), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, as "immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's wide ranging allegations fail to state a cause of 
action against these defendants for the reasons set forth above, 
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and the action against defendants Helmut Rienicke and Allison 
Garland (Rienicke) should be dismissed. 
In the alternative, the court should strike all of the 
immaterial, irrelevant, and defamatory allegations of the complaint 
and instruct plaintiffs to make a more definite statement of their 
causes of action against these defendants. 
Respectfully submitted this day of November, 198 6. 
HINTZE, BROWN, FAUST, 
BLAKESLEY & McPHIE 
C. REED BROWN 
Attorney for defendants Helmut 
E. Rienicke and Allison 
Garland 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, 
Motion to Strike, and Motion for More Definite Statement, postage 
prepaid, on the day of November, 1986 to: 
Loren D. Martin 
Attorney for plaintiffs 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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C. Reed Brown 
HINTZE, BROWN, FAUST, 
BLAKESLEY & McPHIE 
Attorney for Defendants Helmut 
Reinicke and Allison Garland 
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801) 484-7632 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WASATCH TOOL & DIE, INC., and | 
JUERGEN MUELLER, ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
HELMUT E. REINICKE, et al. 
Defendants. 
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i MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF | DEFENDANTS', REINICKE AND 
> GARLAND'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
) AMENDED COMPLAINT 
i Case No. C86-7931 
i Judge James S. Sawaya 
Defendants Helmut E. Reinicke and Allison Garland submit 
the following Memorandum in support of their Second Motion to 
Dismiss: 
Defendants assert that plaintiffs, in their Amended 
Complaint, have still failed to state a cause of action against 
these defendants for which relief can be granted. In addition, 
plaintiffs have failed to remove the defamatory and irrelevant 
allegations from their Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint also reads more like a memorandum than a complaint. 
Plaintiffs have attempted to set forth black letter law, but have 
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failed to allege specific facts which would support their allega-
tions against these defendants. In support of these assertions, 
defendants incorporate herein their previous Memorandum in support 
of Motion to Dismiss and set forth the following: 
DEFAMATORY AND IRRELEVANT ALLEGATIONS 
Plaintiffs have failed to remove defamatory and irrelevant 
allegations from their Amended Complaint. Though they have changed 
the allegations of burglary and theft to "trespass" and "conver-
sion", this does not cure the offense. On page 4 of the Amended 
Complaint, plaintiffs allege "an argument related to the use of 
drugs." On page 5, plaintiffs allege that Reinicke had "been 
growing what appeared to be and was admitted to be a marijuana 
plant" and that he had been "diistributing to and engaging with 
employees in the use of intoxicating liquor and what appeared to be 
marijuana," and that Reinicke used "drugs with employees on the 
job." All of these allegations are defamatory and irrelevant to 
any of the causes of action claimed by plaintiffs. 
THE ENUMERATED CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT REINICKE 
Trespass. 
The plaintiffs have alleged against defendant Reinicke a 
"trespass" which occurred in 1980. The applicable statute of 
limitation is U.C.A. 78-12-26(1) which provides for a three year 
limitation. This period has long since run. 
Conversion 
Plaintiffs have failed to allege the elements of conver-
sion, including the specific property alleged to have been conver-
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ted by defendant Reinicke. They prefer to set forth the law rather 
than the facts. In addition to improperly pleading the conversion, 
plaintiffs have waited beyond the three year period of limitation 
set forth in U.C.A. 78-12-26(2) for bringing their action. 
Negligence 
Plaintiffs have attempted to use the criminal statutes to 
impose upon defendants a new standard for negligence. While 
statutes may set forth a standard of care, this is not true for 
every statute drafted by the legislature. The Utah Supreme Court, 
in Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 850 (Utah 1981), has established 
criteria which a plaintiff must meet in order to rely on a statute 
for a standard of care. The plaintiff must show, "(1) the exis-
tence of the statute or ordinance, (2) that the statute or ordin-
ance was intended to protect the class of persons which includes 
the party, (3) that the protection is directed toward the type of 
harm which has in fact occurred as a result of the violation, and 
(4) that the violation of the ordinance or statute was a proximate 
cause of the injury complained of." Hall at 850, emphasis added. 
Plaintiffs have, in fact, shown only the first of these 
elements, that the statute exists. They then make the conclusory, 
logical leap to conclude "The violation of any one or combination 
of the above crimes consitutes a violation of a significant minimum 
standard of care and duty imposed by law." Amended Complaint, page 
22. This does not meet the burden imposed by the Utah Supreme 
Court for imposing a standard of care from a statute. 
Since plaintiffs rely on a non-existent standard of care, 
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they are unable to allege a violation of a standard sufficient to 
support a claim of negligence against defendant Reinicke. 
As with plaintiffs' other allegations, the statutes of 
limitations for all of the offenses included under their "negli-
gence" cause of action have run. 
Improper Interference With Contract 
Plaintiffs allege that Reinicke improperly interfered with 
plaintiffs' contractual relations with EIMCO. This cause of action 
fails on several accounts. First, the alleged actions and damages 
occurred in 1980 and 1981. The statutory period of limitation for 
this type of action is four years. U.C.A. 78-12-25(2). Plaintiffs 
have failed to take action within the prescribed period. 
Second, the sale of defendant Reinicke's interest in 
Wasatch Tool to Mueller did not include any sort of non-competition 
agreement. Defendant Reinicke was free to enter business in compe-
tition with Wasatch Tool. This includes competition for work from 
a major customer like EIMCO. The mere fact that plaintiffs' work 
from EIMCO amounted to an increasingly smaller percentage of plain-
tiffs' overall business does not, of itself, imply an improper 
interference by Reinicke, but could be a result of legitimate 
competition. 
Plaintiffs allege that payments made by Reinicke to defen-
dants Burt Randall and John Ward constituted bribes to divert work 
from plaintiffs to defendant Reinicke. However, plaintiffs acknow-
ledge that Ward did work for Reinicke, though they imagine this 
work to be a subterfuge to conceal the purpose of the payments. 
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They do not adequately explain why someone would work for money 
which is allegedly already given to him as a bribe. 
Regarding payments made by Reinicke to defendant Burt 
Randall, the Court has affidavits of both parties which explain 
that the payments were made for the purchase of a half-interest in 
a boat owned by both men. Plaintiffs have failed to allege 
contrary facts which would support their bribery claims. 
Interestingly, plaintiffs also fail to allege facts which 
show the existence of an enforceable contract between plaintiffs 
and EIMCO which defendants could have interfered with. Plaintiffs 
also have made no effort to bring an action against EIMCO for 
breach of their "contract", an indication that perhaps no contract 
existed. 
Because the statute of limitation has run and because there 
are no facts supporting plaintiffs' allegations, plaintiffs have 
failed to plead a cause of action for interference with contract 
for which relief can be granted. 
Interference With Prospective Economic Relations 
Plaintiffs' claim for this cause of action relies heavily 
on the allegations of commercial bribery based on payments made by 
Reinicke. These payments have been explained above. 
Even if these allegations made out a cause of action, it 
would be barred by the running of the statute of limitation as in 
all of plaintiffs' other allegations. 
Since there was no improper means of interference, i.e. 
commercial bribery, defendant Reinicke's competition with plain 
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tiffs for work from EIMCO amounted to free enterprise competition 
for which the defendant cannot be criticised. Plaintiffs have 
again failed to plead an action for which relief can be granted. 
Prima Facie Tort 
Plaintiffs' allegations of Prima Facie Tort read like a 
memorandum rather than a properly framed complaint. The general 
implication is that if one person feels offended by another, there 
must certainly be a tort occurring, regardless of the facts of the 
situation. Plaintiffs simply have not alleged any actions of 
defendant Reinicke which fall within a statutory limitation period 
and have caused damage to plaintiffs. 
Racketeering Activity 
For a more comprehensive discussion of the racketeering 
cause of action, see defendants7 previous Memorandum in support of 
Motion to Dismiss. As in the other allegations, plaintiffs ignore 
the time factors necessary for the requisite events. For example, 
in order to fall within the Utah Racketeering Act, U.C.A. 76-10-
1601 et seq., at least one event must have occurred after 1981 (the 
enactment date of the statute). All of the events alleged by 
plaintiffs, except for the "ongoing conspiracy" and the payments to 
other defendants, occurred in 1980. The payments are explained 
above, and the "conspiracy" discussed below. 
In addition, the last event must have occurred within three 
years of the time of filing the action. U.C.A. 78-12-26(4). 
Plaintiffs have failed to plead an effective cause of action which 
has satisfied these time requirements and would qualify as an act 
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under U.C.A. 76-10-1602(1). 
In the only case interpreting the Utah Racketeering Act, 
Bache Halsev Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust, 
558 F.Supp 1042 (D.C.Utah 1983), the court held the Utah act to be 
more demanding than the Federal RICO Act. Where the federal act 
requires proving injury from a pattern of racketeering "with enough 
specificity to show there is probable cause the crimes were 
committed" by the named defendant, Bache at 1045, under the 
stricter standards of the Utah act, 
the predicate crimes must be alleged with 
particularity. The court can determine whether 
the pleadings state a violation of the Utah Act 
only if the facts are sufficient to show that 
the alleged activity would be illegal in Utah 
and would fall into one of the enumerated 
categories. 
Bache at 1047, emphasis added. 
Plaintiffs rely heavily upon their allegations of conspir-
acy to support their charges of racketeering. Although conspiracy 
falls within the enumerated acts of racketeering, "[s]tanding 
alone, a charge of conspiracy does not state a cause of action 
under the Utah Act." Bache at 1048. 
To effectively allege conspiracy as part of racketeering 
activity, the plaintiffs need to show that the parties agreed to 
commit two or more episodes in furtherance of the conspiracy. and 
that they actually did anything beyond "conspiring". 
Even in their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs fail to allege 
against these defendants: 
(1) That they agreed to commit two or more such episodes 
in furtherance of the conspiracy; 
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(2) That they did anything beyond conspiring, if drinking 
together and otherwising associating with the other 
defendants constitutes conspiring; 
(3) A second episode which took place after 1980; 
(4) Any second episode occurring within five years of 
of a preceeding one and within three years of the 
filing of the action; 
(5) Any satisfactory allegation, with sufficient 
particularity, of an enumerated racketeering activity. 
Any allegations of an "ongoing" conspiracy must show facts 
indicating that the conspiracy is, in fact, currently engaged in 
by the parties and causing damage to the plaintiffs. Allegations 
of past events, especially ones for which statutes of limitation 
have run, do not indicate that a "conspiracy" is actively agreed to 
and engaged in by the parties. 
Plaintiffs have failed to meet the time limitations imposed 
by statute to bring a cause of action for racketeering. In addi-
tion, they have failed to allege a satisfactory set of elements to 
make out the racketeering cause of action. 
Violation of Contract Obligations 
Plaintiffs7 allegations under this heading appear to be for 
conversion, which was discussed above. This cause of action also 
fails to fall within the statutory period of limitation and is 
further barred by the doctrines of laches and waiver. 
Moreover, the proper forum for this particular cause of 
action would be in the court hearing Reinicke's previously filed 
action against these plaintiffs for breach of contract. The 
"violation of contract obligations" should be raised in that forum 
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as a counter-claim rather than in this court as a separate cause of 
action. 
Division of Partnership and Accounting 
Plaintiffs have failed to show that they are, in fact, 
legal partners of defendant Reinicke. To begin with, defendant 
Allison Garland did not have a partnership interest in the business 
with defendant Reinicke. Even if she did have such an interest, 
she could not have validly transferred that partnership interest to 
another party without the dissolution of the partnership and the 
new parties forming a new partnership. Plaintiffs did not, in 
fact, enter into a partnership agreement with defendant Reinicke 
and therefore have no partnership interest which gives rise to the 
provisions cited by plaintiffs. 
THE ENUMERATED CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT GARLAND 
All of the above discussion of the causes of action against 
defendant Reinicke also apply to plaintiffs' causes of action 
against defendant Allsion Garland and are herein incorporated as 
they apply. 
Plaintiffs would have the Court believe that, by merely 
saying so, they can impute to another defendant, Allison Garland, 
all of the activities alleged against defendant Reinicke. This 
appears to fall under the "guilty by association" theory. Simply 
knowing of the activities of another defendant, if that in fact was 
the case, does not amount to participating in the same activity to 
the same degree. 
The conspiracy allegations fail due to the arguments set 
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forth above. The other allegations against this defendant are 
barred from becoming a cause of action by the various statutes of 
limitation involved. Plaintiffs have failed to allege any factual 
circumstances which would state a cause of action against this 
defendant for which relief can be granted. 
The "Violation of Contract" alleged against defendant 
Garland does not constitute a cause of action. If defendant 
Garland could have and did transfer her interest to plaintiffs, 
they have no rights against her for division and accounting. 
Since, in fact, defendant Garland could not, under the laws of 
Utah, transfer her interest in the partnership to plaintiffs, 
plaintiffs still have no right to a division and accounting. 
Plaintiffs have failed to allege any other contractual facts which 
would amount to this "Violation of Contract." 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs have failed to amend their complaint to plead a 
satisfactory cause of action against these defendants. They have 
failed to remove the defamatory and irrelevant material. They have 
alleged no facts occuring within the applicable statutes of limita-
tions. They have not plead sufficient causes of action for which 
this court can grant relief. 
Because plaintiffs' claims are all barred by the running of 
statutory periods of limitation and because plaintiffs are unable 
to amend their complaint to make out satisfactory causes of action, 
the complaint against defendants Helmut E. Reinicke and Allison 
Garland should be dismissed with prejudice. 
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Respectfully submitted this day of December, 1986. 
C. Reed Brown 
Attorney for defendants Helmut 
Reinicke and Allison Garland 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, postage 
prepaid, on the day of December, 1986 to: 
Loren D. Martin 
Attorney for plaintiffs 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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